Showing posts with label history. Show all posts
Showing posts with label history. Show all posts

Dec 24, 2020

Against the backdrop of some of the troubling trends that have emerged in statist construction of public human rights history, the question must be asked: What are the ethical and professional obligations of public historians generally and public historians of human rights in particular? What ethical impulses must public historians heed as they engage questions of culpability and accountability in human rights practices?

For example, historians of Nazi Germany have had to be particularly conscientious about issues of trust and professional responsibility, not only thoroughly documenting the unspeakable crimes of an outlaw regime, but also in accurately situating their subject in the context of a particularly violent period. Similarly, post-colonial historical must be conscientious about documenting colonial atrocities while juxtaposing them with the ostensible “social benefits” of colonialism.

Some professions such as the medical and legal professions have, over the years, developed comprehensive codes of ethics to which members are obligated to abide. The process of disciplinary qualification, certification and accreditation is hinged on strict adherence to these codes. Historians have not been traditionally bound by such formal ethical and professional obligations. Although several Historical associations including the American Historical Association and the National Council on Public History have produced broad ethics guidelines on professional conduct, these are not as strict and obligatory as those in some other professions.[1]

Given the instrumentality of public history and particularly, the pivotal role of human rights historians in national commemoration and memorialization projects, we must ask whether it is now time to consider holding public Historians to a stricter and more obligatory ethic code -- perhaps a “Historian’s Hippocratic Oath.”

The Greek origins of the Oath of Hippocrates historically taken by physicians required them to swear by several healing gods, to uphold specific ethical standards. For the public historian, it would require a declared commitment to upholding the basic tenants of our trade - respecting the integrity of primary and secondary sources even while subjecting them to critical scrutiny, contributing in a fair-minded way to scholarly and public debates over what sources tell us about the past, and ensuring that argument are justified by evidence.

This point is well articulated in the AHA's “Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct.”

Practicing history in the public realm presents important challenges, for when historians communicate with a wider public, they must represent not just a particular interpretation or body of facts, but the best practices of the discipline of history itself. This means they must inevitably walk a tightrope in balancing their desire to present a particular point of view with their responsibility to uphold the standards and values that underpin their professional authority as historians.[2]

The call for a “Historian’s Hippocratic Oath” might not be as facetious as it appears. Scholars working within public spaces have the potential to go great public good or harm. A historian who devotes a lifetime of research work to denying the atrocities of the Holocaust or justifying the colonial dispossessions of indigenous can potentially do as much harm as a malevolent physician.

In 2014, it was revealed in a United States Senate Report that contract psychologists devised the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and played a central role in the operation of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program which included the torture of detainees. In some cases, academic psychologists conducted interrogations using new techniques that they had developed.[3]

This revelation triggered renewed debates within medical and academic communities about the ethical obligations of medical professionals involved in state security projects. Admittedly, historians are less likely to be embroiled in such controversies. But at a time when historians are increasingly being called upon to lend their expertise to national memorialization projects, we need to re-open the conversation about public trust and the historian’s ethical obligations. Public trust in historians as experts confers a set of responsibilities to the public: to bring that expertise to bear in debates about the past in the present.

There are at least two sides to the debate about professional ethics. On one hand, public historians have been urged to guard against being used simply to rationalize and legitimize statist agendas, particularly those that serve to exclude and further marginalize subaltern constituencies. On the other hand, public historians have to be equally mindful of their roles as advocates. 

They must guard against appropriating the stories of the oppressed and victimized in ways that drown out these voices, undermine scholarly objectivity or erode public trust. As the AHA’s “Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct” cautions: “The desire to score points as an advocate should never tempt a historian to misrepresent the historical record or the critical methods that the profession uses to interpret that record.” [4]

These debates are particularly relevant to the memorialization of human rights atrocities and the role of historians and museums in documenting these atrocities. The narratives that museum and memorial sites construct through their collections and displays can represent powerful historiographies.

For an increasing number of museums dedicated to social and memorial histories, these histories are recuperated from silenced or disappeared pasts. The act of making these histories public is an important moment in the lives of the individuals who have experienced trauma, as it is for the collective memory and catharsis of society.[5]

The ethical and professional obligation of the public historian of human rights is therefore not simply academic. They also have practical real-world implications on the lived experiences of individuals and communities.

(Excepts from: Bonny Ibhawoh, “Why Public History?” Paper presented at the International Congress of Historical Sciences, 23-29 August, Shandong University, Jinan, Shandong, China, August 2015).


[1] The American Historical Association’s “Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct” (updated 2011) at http://historians.org/jobs-and-professional-development/statements-and-standards-of-the-profession/statement-on-standards-of-professional-conduct

[2] AHA, “Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct.”

[3] Jefferson M Fish “Psychologists played a key role in the CIA torture program.” Psychologists and Torture.www.psychologytoday.com/blog/looking-in-the-cultural-mirror/201412/psychologists-and-torture. (Accessed June 16, 2015.)

[4] AHA, “Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct.”

[5] Carter, “Human Rights Museums and Pedagogies of Practice,” 328.

 

A Hippocratic Oath for Historians

Oct 18, 2020


There is renewed debate over interpretation and authority in constructing histories of indigenous peoples. Some historians such as David Silverman have critiqued sustained collaborative approaches with indigenous communities in writing their history. They contend that such approaches undermine scholarly objectivity and amount to a cession of scholarly authority over interpretation. Silverman's skepticism of community engaged histories of indigenous and native people is evident in his scathing review of two award-winning books on Native-American history in a recent issue of the American Historical Review. (AHR Exchange: Historians and Native American and Indigenous Studies” in The American Historical Review vol. 125, issue 2, April 2020). 

In this commentary, I reflect on this new assault on community-engaged approaches to indigenous history.

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In her ground-breaking book, Decolonizing methodologies: research and indigenous peoples, Linda Tuhiwai Smith wrote:

From the vantage point of the colonized, a position from which I write, and choose to privilege, the term 'research' is inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism. The word itself, 'research', is probably one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world's vocabulary. When mentioned in many indigenous contexts, it stirs up silence, it conjures up bad memories, it raises a smile that is knowing and distrustful. It is so powerful that indigenous people even write poetry about research. The ways in which scientific research is implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism remains a powerful remembered history for many of the world's colonized peoples.

Smith’s observations, made in the context of the colonial histories of indigenous peoples in Australia, applies perfectly to colonial African history.

Responding to calls to teach African history from indigenous perspectives in 1963, Hugh Trevor Roper, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University famously stated: “Perhaps in the future, there will be some African history to teach. But, at present there is none: there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness...” Roper was reaffirming for a 1960s European audience, a longstanding assumption about the supremacy of Western positivist notions of history and scholarly objectivity. It was a view of history that had little or no place for indigenous voices or perspectives.

Two centuries earlier, the German Historian Leopold von Ranke, credited as the "founder of modern source-based history," argued that the job of the historian is to “objectively” document facts, not offer subjective interpretation of these facts. 

Yet, these European historians, purveyors of “accurate history” and “scholarly objectivity” were themselves deeply invested in the "identity politics” of their time. Roper's magnus opus, "The Rise of Christian Europe" was a grand narrative of the triumph of Western Europe over other civilizations. Ranke was a German nationalist and protestant conservative historian, who wrote only monarchist and political history. In David Silverman’s recent review of Lisa Brooks’s and Christine De Lucia’s books in the American Historical Review, I hear modern-day echoes of Roper and Ranke. 

Criticism of “ethnohistorians” who do indigenous history through community-engaged research, rests on the assumption that they are straying from a sacrosanct path of scholarly detachment and objectivity. Critics like Silverman insist that research methods used to study predominantly oral indigenous societies, must conform to dominant standards of Western empiricism and positivist epistemology. 

My response is to question the intellectual validity of this claim to universal “objectivity.” I assert indigenous African ontologies and epistemologies as legitimate ways of knowing. I frame indigenous epistemologies as a counter to hegemonic Eurocentric positivist ways of knowing that have been cast as universal, objective, and immutable. 

Critics like Silverman dismiss the works of scholars who do community-engaged native studies as “beholden to identity politics” and their works as “contaminated with politics.” But isn’t all scholarship linked to individual and collective identities? Is any scholarly endeavor truly impervious to the politics of identity? 

Critics of community-engaged ethnohistory call for the “application of the same critical eye, in the same transparent fashion, to tribal knowledge as to manuscript evidence.” What these critics fail to consider is the possibility that what constitutes “critical eye" methodology when dealing with living and breathing oral tradition in tribal contexts might be different from "critical eye” methodology applicable to dead and cold archival manuscripts.

With Silverman and his likes, I suspect that the concern is not so much with collaborative research but with a certain kind of collaborative research - one that privileges long marginalized voices and perspectives which they find unfamiliar or uncomfortable. After all, historians have always “collaborated” with their sources – with archivists through the archives they produce, with long dead state officials through the manuscripts they left behind, and with statisticians through the selective data they compile. 

Silverman concludes: "... the epistemological quandary is that historians and Native communities sometimes have different standards of proof and truth." I would frame it slightly differently: "...the epistemological quandary is that historians fixated on Western positivist intellectual traditions and Native communities have different notions of proof and truth."

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My research focuses on the indigenous African notions of human rights within the context of global debates about universal human rights. This relates to indigenous notions of law, ethics, and human dignity.

Much of this debate has centred on the place of African history within the broader history of the global human rights movement. The contemporary meanings of human rights have come to be closely associated with universalism and internationalism. This conception of human rights follows from the notion that human nature is universal and entails an ontological superiority to the individual.  This concept of human rights conveys an intrinsic entitlement to autonomy and equality that all individuals can demand from the state, and which are (or ought to be) institutionally protected by the state. The universal character of modern human rights makes it essential to interpret  ethnohistories from global comparative perspectives.

Constructing human rights histories from indigenous African perspective had centered on arguments for an African concept of human rights founded on communitarian values and distinct from dominant “Western” human rights traditions that are premised on atomized individualism. These Western notions of rights have been the dominant influence in the development of international human rights from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

In my work, I seek to center indigenous African notions of human rights and human dignity within the discourse of universal human rights. The notion of an African concept of human rights is linked to long standing philosophical debates about African conceptions of human nature. At the heart of this debate is the claim that indigenous communal African conceptions of human nature stands in contrast to Western liberal conceptions which foreground humans as an autonomous individual defined by their intrinsic worth. In this view, the African conception of human nature, individual identity is said to be grounded in social interaction and community life.

African ethnohistories underscore the centrality of the relationship between notions of human dignity, individual rights and communal obligations. Some of these interpretations of indigenous moral thought is a humanistic outlook that sees human dignity and honor as fundamental to individual and collective wellbeing. But these interpretations suggest that the communitarian outlook of indigenous African social system did not necessarily imply the absence or rejection of individual rights. If anything, the dynamic between individual rights and communal obligations is more complicated than is often presented.

The main challenge of centering indigenous notions of human rights is that some human rights scholars’ critique arguments for indigenous African conceptions of human rights as arguments for cultural relativism that undermine universal human rights. They claim that arguments for cultural relativism are often used as excuses by authoritarian governments to violate the rights of citizens. Universal human rights guarantees against such abuses.

In my interventions in these debates, I do not seek to repudiate universal human rights but to frame universal human rights in terms of indigenous humanism. This concept of human rights transcends formal legalism. It is based on indigenous humanist values centered mainly on conceptions of personhood, notions of human dignity and honor, and the value of community.

An indigenous perspective to human rights posits that human dignity can be construed as universal but can also be construed as socially specific and culturally contingent. While many societies set minimum standards of respect for the life and basic liberties of social outsiders, the “humanity” of each individual is ultimately contingent on the social and political belonging.

This position is not simply a cultural relativist challenge to universal human rights. Rather, it is a questioning of what constitutes the “universal” in the context of universal human rights. I argue that the “universal” is not an abstraction. The “universal” is ontologically meaningless if not the aggregate of constituent “locals.” Indigenous African notions of human rights and ways of knowing ought to be integral to what constitutes universal human rights. Without these indigenous notions, what is claimed as universal human rights cannot be truly universal.

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What does it mean to write authoritatively about Indigenous pasts while being attentive to historical justice?

To write authoritatively about the indigenous past is to insist on the validity of indigenous ways of knowing and indigenous knowledge production processes. We cannot do so effectively without confronting critics who question counterhegemonic approaches.

When “ethnohistorians” who attend to native perspectives are accused of shoddy and uncritical scholarship or of "cherry picking” evidence we should ask the critics: Which history isn’t cherry-picked? Historical evidence has and continues to be cherry picked to devastating effects for indigenous people. 

 When critics like Silverman accuse ethnohistorians of not being critical enough of their tribal sources and question the presentism and reliability of native sources, we should ask: Have the same questions been asked of the "manuscripts" fetishized in colonial and settler archives? How do we counteract centuries of erasure of native voices, and the gaping silences and distortions of colonial and settler archives without privileging these native voices?  

 Community-engaged ethnohistories are not beyond criticism, however. Within these fields, there are longstanding and vibrant debates about evidence, interpretations, and arguments. In African history, for example, we talk frequently about the perils of swinging the post-colonial pendulum too far in ways that might re-create the same colonial distortions that we challenge. With critics like of Silverman, however, we have fundamental epistemological differences over what constitutes the "objective" centre of that pendulum.

Can we trust the Natives? Researchers, Indigenous Peoples and Scholarly Authority

Sep 6, 2020


Human Rights, Nation-States and the Persistence of Oppressive Privilege - A commentary on Eric D. Weitz,A world divided: The global struggle for human rights in the age of nation-states, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2019). 

Eric Weitz's book A World Divided offers a compelling history of the global struggle for human rights in the age of nation-states. Eric Weitz presents insightful stories of travelers, scholars, activists and statesmen who fashioned empires into nation-states from the late eighteenth century to the present period. These are stories of rights ideas and struggles at defining moments in nation-state foundings and formations. Overall, it is a narrative of the paradox of human rights, celebrating its triumphs and critiquing its failures. 

My commentary focuses on two themes that emerge from the book. The first is the question of human rights ontology; not necessarily the definition of human rights, but the varied contextual meanings of human rights and the relationships between them. I am interested in how Weitz deploys human rights as an analytical lens for his historical reconstructions. 

Like the concept of globalization, the notion of “human rights” provides historians with fresh analytic lens for creative reinterpretations of the past. With this new lens, familiar stories of human struggles, political crises and social upheavals can be re-told in ways that further illuminate our understanding of these histories. 

The doctrine of human rights has become the dominant language for public good in our world. It has become the language of choice for making and contesting entitlement claims, spawning a global human rights revolution – a revolution of norms and values that has redefined our understanding of ethics and justice.  So, the question inevitably arises: given the discursive power of human rights today, how much of the history that we see through human rights lens is an illumination of the past as it was, and how much of that history is a projection from the lens itself? 

The second theme of my commentary is the persistence of oppressive privilege. Like all histories, A Divided World is a narrative of changes and continuities – changes in the expansion of citizenship rights in emergent nations-states, and continuities of systems of oppression and exclusion. In between the lines of Weitz’s narrative of human rights struggles, we can also find histories of oppressive privileges of all sorts – white privilege, Christian privilege, ethno-cultural privilege, intellectual and epistemological privilege, and perhaps, the most enduring of all, male privilege. 

If the grand narrative of A World Divided is the complicated and paradoxical history of human rights, its sub-narrative is the equally complicated history of the persistence of oppressive privilege. Oppressive privilege has shaped the history human rights over the past two centuries. To fully appreciate Weitz’s grand human rights narrative, therefore, we must pay attention to the sub-narrative of oppressive privilege. 

The Ontology of Human Rights

The historical ontology of human rights - understood broadly as the interconnected socio-political processes by which human rights ideas have emerged - is evident throughout A Divided World.   The compelling cases in the book show the contradictions and partiality of human rights advances when built around national citizenship. 

Exclusion and inclusion, rights protection and violations, Weitz argues, have defined the emergence of the nation-state. “The contradictions are blatant and cannot be easily recovered resolved or wished away… They are irresolvable and an intrinsic part of the human rights system based on nation-state citizenship.”  

While historical reinterpretation using human rights lens can illuminate our understanding of the past, there is always the risk of overexposure. Here, photography offers a useful metaphor. In the hands of the historian, the human rights lens is most effective when it is neither underexposed nor overexposed. When underexposed, the story is deficient because the complex histories of rights ideas and struggles are insufficiently illuminated. 

Too little of the “light” that human rights have reflected on human events is recorded. When overexposed, however, the narrative becomes distorted. Too much of today’s human rights sensibilities is projected into interpretations of historical ideas and events. As in photography, therefore, effectively deploying the human rights lens for historical reconstruction requires the correct amount of exposure. 

Historians are often reminded to avoid foisting their own problem definitions on the people and societies they study. Historians should leave open the possibility that the historical actors they write about might have considered themselves part of a different drama than the one the historian imagines. 

In the context of A Word Divided, this raises a crucial question: Did eighteenth century Western travelers, who explicitly excluded Indians and Blacks from rights bearing citizenship, think of human rights in ways even remotely resembling contemporary conceptions of human rights? Weitz clarifies that the historical actors he writes about had a partial understanding of human rights, one that availed only certain categories of people defined by race, religion, ethnicity, gender and other identity markers. 

Weitz largely succeeds in the delicate task of reinterpreting familiar histories of nation-state formation through human rights lens in ways that appear “correctly exposed” – neither underexposed nor overexposed. However, he does not tell us what type of human rights lens he has used. Although he argues that the nation-state and human rights have played a central role in the making of our global world, he does not offer a definitive answer to the question of the meaning of human rights.  

Rather, he takes “an open ended, capacious, and practical approach to the disputes regarding the philosophy and history of human rights.”  Anticipating critics, Weitz states that some will dispute that the cases he recounts have anything to do with human rights. “They would say that these examples and thousands of others we could summon are too fragmentary and episodic to constitute a full blown program of human rights.”  

Even though he concedes that we need some distinctions, he rejects this argument, opting for a more fluid understanding of human rights.  On this, I agree with Weitz. The essentialist definitions of human rights preferred by those who see human rights as a uniquely twentieth century phenomenon disconnected from earlier notions of rights, limits our understanding of how rights ideas and struggles have shaped our world. A less rigid notion of human rights allows for better understanding of the deep and complex history and politics of human rights.

Still, the debate about human rights ontology remains integral to histories of human rights. Making histories of pre-twentieth century human rights struggles intelligible to twenty-first century audiences demands some definitional parameters. Weitz acknowledges that as the circle of rights bearing citizens has expanded, so has the meaning of these rights. Therefore, in order to fully understand the historical development of human rights, we first “need to see just how radical a break is our own modern world from the preceding millennia marked by empires; small, regional forms of governance; and tribes and clans - all of them built systems of inequality and non-recognition at least in terms of rights of other individuals.”  

Indeed, only since 1945 has the emergence of international human rights offered in model of universal rights beyond the nation-states. While we might debate whether this late model of universal human rights constitutes the defining essence of human rights, most commentators agree that it provides the ontological reference point for our understanding of human rights. 

The universalist human rights model that emerged in the aftermath World War II, and in the context of the United Nations, was a response to the limitations of nation-state-based citizenship rights. The holocaust and other war-time atrocities showed that states could not be trusted to protect the rights of citizens and subjects. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights marked the international recognition of certain fundamental and inalienable rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled simply by virtue of their humanity, and not because they are citizens of the nations. 

The hope was that universal human rights would be the antidote to the partiality and contradictions of nation-state-based citizenship rights regimes. This promise has, of course, not been fully materialized. However, it provides a powerful reference point for understanding histories of rights struggles in the era of empires and emergent nations states. 

Oppressive Privilege

Scholars have long drawn attention to the inequities and injustices wrought on societies by systems of oppressive privilege. In his influential 1891 land reform treatise titled The Birthright of Man, the Scottish classicist William Ogilvie described “landlordism” and aristocratic land monopolies as a “most oppressive privilege, by the operation of which the happiness of mankind has been for ages invaded and restrained, more than by all the tyrannies of kings, the imposture of priests, and the chicane of lawyers, taken together...” A few men, he lamented, “were permitted to engross a most oppressive privilege - the exclusive rights to the immovable value of soil.” 

Later political theorist have shown how the preservation of oppressive privilege in the face of popular pressure for egalitarian measures, provides the principal motivation for the separation between the public political realms with citizenship rights and a private non-political one with limited rights protection.  

If citizenship rights in the eighteenth and nineteenth century contexts that Weitz discusses were so restrictive and premised on the exclusion and subordination of others, do they really fit within the ontology of human rights? True, rights may bestow privileges, but oppressive privileges (embodied, ascribed or acquired), reinforced by power, is the very antithesis of human rights. 

Oppressive privilege bestows benefits, immunities or exemptions on persons or restricted group of persons, to the exclusion of others, and at the expense of the rights of others. As Weitz notes, the establishment and expansion of human rights have never been pure and straight. The paradoxes of human rights manifest in the patterns of inclusions and exclusions that accompanied nation-states and the establishment citizenship-based rights regimes.  

Human rights are typically framed as claims against the authorial power of states; yet human rights have historically been mediated by hierarchies of power and privilege. A Divided World offers many examples of this. In his discussion of Indian removals in America, Weitz notes that the vision of the nation-state as the preserve of one race meant that Euro-American whites would be able to enjoy the full complement of rights available at the time, while indigenous people will be pushed to the margins.  

White privilege was founded on what Weitz describes as the “racial international” - a racialized way of thinking about human diversity that transcended national borders. Nineteenth century Western statesmen and writers drew on Darwin’s ideas on biological evolution and the “survival of the fittest” to promote an agenda of scientific racism that affirmed the embodied privileges of some, with devastating consequences for others. The nation-state, defined in racial terms, would mark the “the most exclusionary and potentially deadly form of categorizing populations” as Weitz shows in the cases of United States, Brazil, Namibia, and Rwanda and Burundi.  

Discourses and practices of citizenship rights in these historical contexts also then become discourses and practices of privilege - white privilege, Christian privilege, varied forms of ethno-cultural privileges, ethnic privilege, religious privilege, male privilege and elite privilege. 

To understand the paradoxes of human rights, we must first understand the ways in which oppressive privilege determined patterns of rights inclusion and exclusion. For example, the persistence of embodied privilege partly explains why nineteenth century British liberal reformists could condemn the contemptuous way English imperialists treated the Indians while at the same time advancing arguments of Indian intellectual and cultural inferiority that sustained such contemptuous treatment.   

In the increasingly cosmopolitan world of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Western military, technological and governmental superiority came with immense power and privileges for those within the circle of a particular race, religion, culture and ideology. This would shape the pace and patterns of rights inclusion and exclusion in the era of declining empires and emergent nation-states. Privileged ideas about the hierarchy of races, cultures and civilizations influenced the organization of states and determined who could be entitled to right-bearing citizenship, when and how.

Weitz provides an insightful example of the power of this kind of privilege in the writings of Lord Byron and the English Philhellenes who supported the Greek revolution against Ottoman rule. The Philhellenes justified the exclusion of Muslims from the Greek state on grounds of what they saw as Greek subjection under Ottoman “barbarity.” Byron called on the Great Powers to rescue the Greeks from bondage and destruction while ignoring the atrocities committed by Greeks against Muslims. 

For all their humanitarian sensibilities, Byron and other Philhellenes “could not surmount the political contradictions of their positions.” They were in love with Greece, and it was a Greek state that they wanted, one in which other populations, most notably Muslims and Jews, would be rendered invisible.  

Why couldn’t Bryon and other Philhellenes of his time surmount the political contradictions of their positions? Partly, I would argue, because of the persistence of oppressive privilege – in this case, ethno-religious privilege. Philhellenes like Bryon campaigned for the Greek cause by arousing European consciences; but they also invoked the specter of the loss of Christian dominance and privilege. 

Could Europeans stand by and allow fellow Christians to be subdued? In Russia, pan-Slavists and an emergent public sphere exercised similar pressure on the tsarist government to aid fellow Orthodox Christians.  This was as much a cause to uphold Christian ascendancy and privileges as it was a cause for liberty. The Greek revolt would ultimately succeed only with European help, rendered in the name of Christian liberties. 

It did not matter that the rights claimed by Greek nationalists were limited to men who adhered to the Greek Orthodox religion. However, as Weitz notes, these rights were not static. Especially after 1945, they broadened significantly and expanded progressively. But to understand the pace and patterns of rights expansion and contraction, we must pay attention to the tenacity of oppressive privilege.

The persistence of oppressive privilege also explains the paradox of human rights in the case of Indian removals in the United States. Once indigenous nations were defeated, and Minnesota and the Dakotas were incorporated as federal states, US politicians contemplated the legal and political status of Indians. Did the Fourteenth amendment equal protection clause apply to these newly subjugated people? Were Indians to be accorded citizen rights as individuals or as collectives?  The court decisions that addressed these questions struggled with balancing the liberal promise of citizenship rights with entrenched white privilege. 

As Weitz shows, these court decisions affirmed Indian collective land rights but only to the extent that they did not impinge on the embodied, ascribed and acquired privileges of white settler population. Indians, the courts held, had rights of occupancy, not of absolute title. So long as they haunted, fished and farmed on areas clearly delineated theirs following conquest, and so long as they had not ceded land to whites through treaties, Indians possessed their land. But the absolute ultimate title lay with the “discoverer,” the Europeans and their descendants who had come from distant shores.  

In effect, the extent of Indian rights was contingent on what white privilege would accommodate. As Weitz notes, the Euro-Americans who settled in Minnesota quickly “assumed all the rights, privileges, and protections that the American nation-state had to offer. If newly arrived from Europe, they only had to declare their intent to become citizens and they could vote, speak out, and find redress in the courts.”  

The devastating power of oppressive privilege to subjugate and disenfranchise is perhaps most evident in the case of Brazil. Nineteenth century Brazilian statesmen who lauded the mixing of races, did so only because they believed it would eventually whiten the entire population and lead to the elimination of blacks as a group. 

The extinction of the black race in Brazil was the primary motivation for seemingly liberal attitudes toward miscegenation. Even though Brazilian racists did not believe that race mixing led to the degeneration of the race, (unlike most European and North American intellectual racists of their day), they shared a common goal of maintaining white ascendency and privilege – one group, by segregation, the other by strategic dilution. In all cases, the belief in black inferiority, strengthened by so-called racial science, furthered the ideology of white supremacy and its associated privileges.

Conclusion

The stories that Weitz tells in A World Divided are as much about the tenacity of oppressive privilege as there about human rights and the foundings of nation-states. The logic of the nation-state that emerges and prevailed after World War I was founded on expansions and constrictions of citizenship rights in patterns mediated by oppressive privilege. 

As Weitz concludes from his cases, “The nation-state granted Orthodox Christians in Greece, Euro-Americans in the United States, light skinned males in Brazil the privileges and responsibilities that came with rights. They possessed the benefits of full citizenship, including security of property and persons and the ability to participate politically, that human rights offer. For those who did not fit determinant category, it was a different matter, even more so with the rise of the explicit category of minority.”  

To be sure, since the mid-twentieth century the circle of human rights has extended beyond propertied white men, as was largely the case in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Universal human rights now specifically encompass several previously excluded groups – children, persons with disability, asylum seekers, indigenous people, stateless persons, and more broadly, women. 

However, as we see in the global rise of xenophobic populism, exclusionary nationalism, growing economic inequalities, and the proliferation of toxic forms of digital communication that reinforce prejudice, oppressive privilege continues to constrain human rights. Contemporary debates about the prioritisation of human rights centre on questions of power and privilege. Why have certain human rights agendas gained prominence and visibility over others despite the rhetoric of the indivisibility of human rights? 

Even the dominant generations of human rights ordering where first generation individual-centred civil and political rights precede second generation economic and social, and third generation collective solidarity rights, are steeped in histories of power and oppressive privilege. Power and privilege continue to mediate human rights doctrine, raising fundamental questions about its normative objectivity. 

This partly explains why the bulk of the cases before the International Criminal Court (ICC) have originated in weak African states and why, as Weitz opines, it is unlikely that any of the Great Powers will ever be hauled before the court for human rights violations.  Thus, as in the eighteenth century, the reach of the ICC is contingent on what Great Power privileges will allow.

A World Divided captures the contradictions of human rights and the processes of inclusion and exclusion as the circle of human rights expanded with the emergence of nation-state settings. However, explaining these contradictions remains an ongoing task. We need to better understand how historical and contemporary systems of oppressive privilege engender the many paradoxes of human rights so vividly captured in this book.

(This commentary first appeared as a book review in the Journal of Genocide Research)



Human Rights, Nation-States and the Persistence of Oppressive Privilege in a Divided World

Apr 3, 2020




Amidst the current COVID-19 pandemic, I asked my friend, colleague and the most versatile historian I know, Dr. John Weaver, to reflect on what we can learn from history about the aftermath of the current pandemic. Here’s his insightful take.

After Pandemic: Imagining a post-Covid-19 World

John Weaver

As a way of thinking about a Plan B, I’d begin with an unremittingly pessimistic assessment of what could happen after the pandemic passes.  After other pandemics and plagues, there were swift economic recoveries because individual and government debt loads were small or there were even savings and state surpluses.  Neither is the case now.

The effects of the quantitative easing from 2008 are still evident in the form government debts (fiscal imbalance) and now governments in charge of major economies are shooting the works to cushion full the socio-economic impact of social distancing.  Admirable actions, though I’ve heard officials admit that they have no idea where this will lead.  They are not proceeding with targeted expenditures on infrastructure but channelling to support employees and employees.  This all seem sensible or at least the best policy choice when there are no good choices.

For historical precedents, which are probably a worse source of informing current policy than digging deeply into how the world economy currently functions (correcting yesterday’s problems in a dynamic environment is unwise), maybe the best flawed model we have is post-WWI.  In terms of debt and potential for trade imbalances, the situations seem similar.

Central banks then did not fully fund their governments’ debts (except for the UK which financed the war with bonds and taxes).  Most belligerents printed money, leading to post-war inflation.  Currently, central banks in some major economies are desperately trying to find assets to enable liquidity and to avoid merely printing money without something to show for it: they are buying government debt (bonds) and likely will soon accept corporate assets (maybe are already). 

Not only do they have to do this to fund the new government spending programmes , but my reading of some news suggests that a few overseas commercial banks have their backs to the wall and need injections of funds from the lenders of last resort (central banks).  They have their backs to the wall because employers and general populace are tapping into lines of credit and savings rates are low.   The banks are running out of capital.  Commercial banks are squeezed and where they are already weak, they may fall over.  Canada’s system is more robust.  Let’s hope so.

After WWI, the crises rippled on and on from one emergency and international Band-Aid to another; many remedies were quite creative.  We might experience some of the 1920s troubles: inflation, especially in assets, and trade protectionism.  The hidden inflation is what we have had since 2008: housing and stocks rising as ‘money’ seeks safe havens.  But unlike the 1920s, there are deflationary pressures now as well  Commodity prices will tumble (oil already) and countries with over-valued fixed exchange rates will not be able to defend their currency and will have to devalue deeply in order to compete in export markets.

Some countries may try rationing imports to reduce the damage to their balance of payments.  Whatever route is taken, a deflationary cycle will spiral downward.  Instead of a decade-long 1920s style period of crisis ours will come on fast and go through a series of emergencies almost concurrently, and they will be asymmetrical in terms of countries and regions.  The daily news will be packed with bank failures, governments defaulting on their debts (with pension fund consequences), and governments lacking residual fiscal firepower.

Taxes will have to be increased and social justice will properly require wealth taxes; however, this additional tax-take will not make up for the loss of revenue from an economic slow down or even marking time.  Widespread national defaults are probably out of the question.  Therefore, combined with tax increases, there will be expenditure cuts, probably more fully reflected in personnel and wages than in direct expenditure programmes.

I won’t go into what my suicide research would imply, except to say I would have little faith in prevention initiatives apart from our own individual care for others. 

Plan B?  No one policy answer.  Muddle on.  Keep the memory alive so that several decades from now, things might be refashioned.  On the health front, reform may have been achieved by then.  But the economic inter-dependency asymmetries and wasted resources through conflict will not have been. History is poor guide to policy, but perhaps not to attitude.       

After Pandemic: Imagining a post-Covid-19 World

Dec 23, 2017



There has been resurgent interest in the seventeenth century Ethiopian philosopher and thinker, Zera Yacob (also identified as Zara Yacob).

Africanists historians and philosophers have long seen Yacob as the pioneer humanist thinker that he was, a precursor to Enlightenment liberal thought. Beyond Africanist scholars however, Yacob’s legacy has largely been obscured, even ignored, partly because of the relative neglect of African epistemic traditions in the Western academy.

But all that now seem to the changing as more non-Africanists re-discover Yacob. In a recent article in Aeon (A digital magazine dedicated to "provocative thinking"), the Norwegian historian Dag Herbjørnsru introduced Yacob to a new audience, placing Yacob firmly in the pantheon of Enlightenment thinkers.

Herbjørnsru argues that liberal Enlightenment ideas may not, as we have been schooled to believe, begin with René Descartes’s Discourse on the Method (1637) or the works of John Locke, Isaac Newton, David Hume, Voltaire and Kant. What if, Herbjørnsru asks, the Enlightenment can be found in places and thinkers that we often overlook such as in the treatises of Zera Yacob?

He states: “Many of the highest ideals of the later European Enlightenment had been conceived and summarized by Yacob long before they emerged in Enlightenment Europe. Yacob shows a much more agnostic, secular and enquiring method" than many later Enlightenment thinkers. By comparing Yacob’s treatises with those of Descartes and Kant, Herbjørnsru concludes that Yacob's ideas more enlightened than his Enlightenment peers on questions of religion, slavery and the status of women.

Herbjørnsru’s article has triggered a vibrant debate over whether Yacob rightly belongs to the Enlightenment pantheon. The main critique is that while Yacob’s thoughts might have been exceptionally liberal for his time, they did not coalesce into a social and political movement as they did with the Enlightenment. Others however, question the wisdom of trying to fit this African thinker into the mold of European philosophers. Yacob, they insist, should be treated on his own terms. If anything, he fits more with a longstanding tradition of African oral and textual humanistic thought. 

While these questions are unlikely to find definitive answers, I am pleased to see the debate happening at all. Given his ground-breaking liberal ideas, Yacob has been in the shadows for too long. Sure, there have been some important studies of this work, but these have never really engaged non-specialist audiences. The current debate promises to put Yacob’s work in the intellectual spotlight where it rightly belongs.

As a historian of human rights, I have long been puzzled by the complete absence of Yacob’s thought in the many "global" histories of human rights that have been written. Discussions of the philosophical antecedents of modem human rights often begin and end with European Enlightenment liberalism. This is why in my book Human Rights in Africa, I place Yacob's Hatata alongside Thomas Pain's "Rights of Man," Rousseau’s "Social Contract and Descartes’ Discourses in my discussion of the ideas that have shaped the modern human rights movement.

My excerpts on Zera Yacob:

“Ethiopian philosopher and theologian Zera Yacob, who is most renowned for his critique of divine law and theory on natural law. In Hatata (Discourse), his polemical treatise on rationalism and Christian theology, he asserted that human action should be judged essentially on whether it advances or degrades overall societal harmony. Yacob’s ethics placed emphasis on human dignity, tolerance, non-violence and mutual responsibility. Two central themes in his work are the sanctity of life and individual freedom. 

The first assertion in the Hatata is that man is created a free being and “endowed with the power of reason and the light of intelligence.” In the Hatata, freedom is defined in relation to individual choice and initiative. Human freedom, like human intelligence, is a gift from God to “man” so that, through good choices, he may fulfill his destiny.

Yacob’s ethics in the Hatata also includes an affirmation of the communitarian duty of each person toward those individuals within the societies in which they live. Although he drew on an eclectic mix of Christian, Muslim and indigenous thought, Yacob’s ethics rejected many established Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions of his time as oppressive and discriminatory. 

His point of departure was rationalism. Man is a creature of God, but he was created to be free and intelligent. On this ground, one Zera Yacob scholar has argued that Yacob’s critique of discrimination against women marked, in the context of seventeenth century Ethiopia, a radical defense of “human rights, equality and freedom.”

Yacob also proffered a moral condemnation of the slave trade because, according to him, it was against God’s will. He wrote: “It is stated in the text that buying and selling human beings like an animal is right . . . this law does not come from the Creator of human beings, who created us equal as brothers, so that we call our creator our Father.”36 For proponents of African human rights values, the humanist ideas in these theological and philosophical writings provide the normative foundations for a conception of human rights founded in African history and culture."

The rediscovery of Zera Yacob is long overdue.

Zera Yacob's Hatata. African Precursor to Enlightenment Liberalism

Dec 9, 2017



Discussions of human rights in Africa are often reduced to simplistic narratives of ruthless violators and benevolent activists. In my new book, Human Rights in Africa (Cambridge University Press) I attempt to go beyond this staid trope.  

This is an account of indigenous African rights traditions embodied in the wisdom of elders and sages; of humanitarians and abolitionists who marshaled arguments about natural rights and human dignity in the cause of antislavery; of the conflictual encounters between natives and colonists in the age of Empire and the “civilizing mission”; of nationalists and anti-colonialists who deployed an emergent lexicon of universal human rights to legitimize long-standing struggles for self-determination; and of dictators and dissidents locked in struggles over power in the era of independence and constitutional rights.

In writing this book, my aim was to tell a story of human rights in Africa that engages key scholarly debates while also appealing to a general audience. This is because the subject of human rights is too important to be left to experts and specialists. Human rights discourses, laws, policies and practices affect the everyday lives of millions of ordinary people in Africa and around the world. I believe it is important to engage the broadest audience possible in conversations about human rights.

In these uncertain times, my hope is that this volume moves forward the conversation on how we can reaffirm human dignity in our societies and actualize human rights ideals in Africa and our world.

Bonny Ibhawoh, Human Rights in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2018)


Bonny Ibhawoh, Human Rights in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2018) [Amazon.com]

Early Reviews

“In Human Rights in Africa, Professor Ibhawoh weaves, in his usual incisive and sharp-witted way, an aptly and appropriately complex and sophisticated story about the long career of human rights thought and action on the African continent. Shorn of the de-historicization, linear progressivism, facile accounting, and de-politicization that has all too often marred human rights scholarship and action in regard to the continent, Human Rights in Africa succeeds vastly in its stated goal of broadly analyzing the development of human rights as idea, discourse and struggle in Africa. The book is a must-read for anyone interested in gaining a thorough understanding of the deep complexity of Africa’s relationship to human rights ideas and practices.”
– Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Professor & York Research Chair in
International and Transnational Legal Studies, York University


“Highly readable, versatile, subtle, nuanced and authoritative, this book gives the subject of human rights an outstanding treatment, superseding most of the current literature on the subject. Its coverage is both balanced and sweeping, moving at a fast pace from the past to the present without losing focus and proportionality. Students will find it a stunning achievement, and scholars will see merit in moving forward so many arguments that the fresh insights open up.”
– Toyin Falola, University Distinguished Teaching Professor and the Frances and Sanger Mossiker Chair in the Humanities,
The University of Texas at Austin

“How can human rights be universal if they originate in one place or are applied to only one sector of humanity? This and related questions have occupied scholars of rights in and outside of Africa for generations. Bonny Ibhawoh’s exciting new work sweeps past this redundancy by delving deeply into rights-based rhetoric, argument, and mobilization by Africans transnationally and transregionally. Ibhawoh connects rights visionaries of the African and diasporic past to the political challenges of the present in provocative and innovative ways and has written a highly readable and teachable book.”
– Benjamin N. Lawrance, Director of INGS, Hon. Barber B. Conable, Jr. Endowed Chair of International Studies, Professor of History and Anthropology, Rochester Institute of Technology

Rethinking Human Rights in Africa

Oct 17, 2016



In this fascinating personal account, Charles Dew, a professor of American History at William's College reminds us that racism, like a genetic trait, can be passed on from generation to generation. People learn to be bigots, but bigotry can also be un-learned. History can teach, but we must be willing to learn.

Charles B. Dew, "The Unmaking of a Racist"
Published in the Chronicle of Higher Education

"The racial prejudice I acquired came more through a process of osmosis than anything else. I learned from watching how others around me behaved, starting with my own family. There were separate cups, saucers, plates, and glasses in our kitchen cupboard to be used by the African-American help — Ed, who mowed our lawn, and a wonderful woman named Illinois, who cleaned for us, did our laundry, and occasionally cooked our meals."

"I learned early on that I should never shake hands with a black man or woman. I was not to use Mr. or Mrs. or Miss when I spoke to an African-American adult. We had separate bathrooms — a poorly appointed half bath off the back porch for the help, a nice, fully tiled bathroom on the second floor of our house for us. I was 8 years old when I watched my father explode in almost uncontrollable anger at a black man who came to the wrong door of our home."

Unlearning Prejudice: History can teach, but we must be willing to learn

Oct 13, 2016




"The Biafran Humanitarian Crisis."

A new book by my former PhD student. Dr Arua Omaka (now lecturer at Federal University, Ndufu Alike, Ikwo, Nigeria).

The Nigeria-Biafra War been described as one of the most significant global humanitarian crisis in the post-Second World War era. Little has been written about this crisis. It has largely been forgotten even as the world deals with comparable humanitarian crisis in Syria and other parts of the world.

Dr. Omaka offers an engaging account in his book. A must-read for anyone interested in African studies and Global Peace and Conflicts studies.

Revisiting Biafra: War and Humanitarian Crisis

Sep 20, 2015

I reflect on the possibilities and perils of peacebuilding in an uncertian and conflicted world. 

Making Impossible Peace

Jun 9, 2015


After 6 years of deliberations, the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission last week released its long-awaited report. The TRC was established following the settlement arising from the abuses by state agents against indigenous people in the residential school system.

The landmark report details accounts of the forced assimilation of aboriginal children and physical and sexual abuse in state-funded, church-run boarding schools. It concludes that what happened at the schools, and the broader aboriginal policy that they were a part of, “can best be described as ‘cultural genocide.’”

The use of the term “cultural genocide” has sparked a furor in Canada’s normally staid public political discourse. Deeply divided opinions have been voiced on the appropriateness of using a term typically reserved of mass killings to describe these historical events.

The polarized reactions that have greeted the Canadian TRC are strikingly similar to the reactions that followed the release of the South African TRC Report a decade ago. Scholars of South Africa often question whether the South African TRC was a “miracle” or model. Can it serve as a model for other countries in the aftermath of serious human rights abuses? Or was it a miracle of the sort that occurs but rarely in the life of nations, dependent on the compelling personalities of extraordinary leaders? The answer seems somewhere in-between.

In their tribute to Nelson Mandela, Justice Sinclair and the other leaders of the Canadian TRC acknowledged that the South African TRC was an inspiration for their work. They stated that their understanding of the purpose and value of truth-telling and reconciliation “owe a great deal” to the South African TRC. Reading through the Canadian TRC Report and its 94 recommendations, the influence of the South African TRC is indeed evident.

As was the case in South Africa, many Canadians have welcomed the Canadian TRC Report as a step towards national catharsis and reconciliation. But as in South Africa where some derisively dismissed the TRC as the “Kleenex Commission” (in reference to the emotional scenes at the Commission’s public hearings), some Canadian have been critical of the Report.

One newspapers contributor commented: “If you want the average Canadian to turn their backs on you, keep using the term ‘Cultural Genocide.’ This is a nonsensical appellation and one sure to get everyone’s backs up. Genocide is what happened in the deliberate and methodical extermination of 6 million Jews by the Germans in WW2 and by the Turks against the Armenians.” The TRC Report need not get anyone’s back up.

This is where I think Canada can learn from South Africa. In South Africa, the TRC did not resolve the complex questions of historical injustices perpetrated under apartheid and opinion remains divided about its record on promoting national reconciliation. What the Commission so effectively did, however, was to provide a forum for open discussions about historical and continuing injustices that had long been ignored or mentioned in hushed tones.

Even amidst the divergent reactions it garnered, the South African TRC Report provided the essential first step in the journey towards coming to terms with a nation’s dark past and charting the path towards reconciliation.

The Canadian TRC Report can play a similar role. It will take the commitment and goodwill of political and civil leaders to push a national program of restitution and reconciliation. Archbishop Desmond Tutu who chaired the South African TRC used Ubuntu, the traditional African notion of interdependent humanity, to legitimize the work of the TRC and to sell its vision of reconciliation to a skeptical nation.

In Canada, a nation that celebrates tolerance and diversity, the TRC Report can provide the foundation of a long overdue program of national learning about a dark chapter of Canadian history.

A first step will be to heed the call of the Report that students in Canadian schools be required to take courses in the history and legacy of aboriginal people and in particular, the history of the residential schools.

Truth and Reconciliation in Canada: Lessons from the South African TRC

Aug 6, 2014

In a recent interview, Christopher Till who is the director of the Apartheid Museum in South Africa talks about the reaction of children and young South Africans when they visit the museum. He noted that many of the children, who were born after the end of apartheid, visit the museum with their parents. What he found most remarkable was how the children interact with each other. After their exposure to the cruelty and brutality of the apartheid system, one question always comes out of their mouths: “What were our parents thinking?”

This speaks volumes. Times have changed. A new generation of South Africans simply cannot wrap their minds around what would have motivated their parents to create or support the cruel and inhuman system of apartheid. "How could our parents have treated other human beings like this?,"  I can imagine them asking themselves?

There is a lesson here for all us in the positions we take on the key moral questions of today - racism, homophobia, poverty and injustice. What positions are we taking today that will prompt our children to ask incredulously, a generation from now:

“What were our parents thinking?”




What were our parents thinking?

Jul 25, 2014

Global security expert: Insurgencies making world more dangerous than even at height of Cold War | CTV News

The world is a more dangerous place “than even at the height of the Cold War,” when the threat of mutually assured destruction kept the world’s superpowers in check, says one historian and global security expert.
With fighting between Israel and Hamas flaring once again and adding to what seems like a growing list of conflicts around the world, the threat to global peace is more significant than ever before, says Bonny Ibhawoh of the Centre for Peace Studies at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ont.

At the height of the Cold War in the 1960s, the United States and Soviet Union were ultimately prevented from engaging in all-out war by the threat of mutually assured destruction, Ibhawoh told CTV’s Canada AM on Thursday.

“But today we live in a world where the weapons of mass destruction are in the hands of militias, insurgencies and so there’s really no control over how these weapons are used around the world,” he said.
During the Cold War, the West had a clearly defined enemy in the Soviet Union and containing Communism was a singular goal.

Now, there are almost too many enemies, Ibhawoh says.
“Fragmented warfare, insurgencies, asymmetrical warfare: That is exactly the problem,” he said, noting that one scholar has coined the term “the democratization of the weapons of mass destruction.”
And unlike the 1960s, when a strong and vocal peace movement tried to drown out the sound of war drums with popular protest songs, activists and artists today are not writing this generation’s “Imagine” or “Blowin’ in the Wind.”

“Today we see that the voices for peace have been drowned out by the voices of extremism and the voices of intolerance and I think that makes us an even more dangerous world today,” Ibhawoh said.
What is also missing today, he says, is grassroots political activism that has the power to push world leaders to the negotiating table to solve conflicts, he said. For example, “a very vigorous grassroots activist movement” in South Africa and around the world helped end apartheid.

“That is missing today,” Ibhawoh said. “And I think that unless you begin to create a space for these kinds of grassroots activism, the prospects for peace in our world are very slim.”

World enduring 'more dangerous times' than at height of Cold War:

Apr 8, 2014





My colleague, Dr. Eugene Nshimiyimana, tells the heart-wrenching story of how he survived the Rwandan genocide. A lesson in the destructiveness of hate and the redeeming power of peace.

Rwanda's Genocide: The Solider and the Survivor


 

It's been 20 years since the genocide in Rwanda. The lesson for the world is a simple one. Never again. Here, my reflections on the genocide. 

CHCH TV News

Monday marks the 20th anniversary of one of the most violent chapters in human history. The Rwandan genocide saw more than one million people massacred. Carried out by Rwanda’s ethnic Hutu’s — they targeted the country’s minority Tutsi and moderate Hutu’s — using machetes, gasoline, guns and grenades.

Dignitaries from around the world attended a ceremony in Rwanda’s capital, Kigali. Actors performed a play based on the genocide. It had some in the audience were overcome with emotion — and needed to be carried away. Many watching lost their entire families in the genocide. For the United Nations, it was an opportunity to reflect on how the world responded two decades ago. Ban-Ki Moon is the U.N. Secretary General: “Many United Nations personnel and others showed remarkable bravery but we could have done much more, we should have done much more.”

The dark chapter in human history is horrific — but is one many say should not be hidden because it can be a lesson for the rest of the world. We caution you that some of the details and images in this next story are disturbing — and not suitable for all viewers. We spoke with two people at McMaster University Monday. One of them was directly impacted by the genocide.

Beatrice Kansayisa left Rwanda to go study in Cyprus, and just in time. Twenty years ago her parents, brothers, sisters and a neice were slaughtered by Hutu’s: “I lost everybody. I could’ve been killed. I’m lucky. I heard different stories but the majority died with machetes.”

She watched on television. The one hundred day long civil war that eventually killed about one million people in Rwanda. The world did nothing — countries who had the ability to intervene had nothing to gain. But McMaster University professor Bonny Ibhawoh says twenty years after the genocide, Rwanda has had to balance justice and reconciliation. “There wasn’t really an appetite for intervening in this obscure part of Africa. No strategic interest. Rwanda has no oil. The Rwandan government has had to tread that fine line between ensuring justice is done to the victims of the genocide but creating a free world that will move the nation forward that allows for reconciliation and healing.

20 years since Rwanda genocide: Never Again

Nov 20, 2013

It's been a particularly productive year for me and my colleagues at McMaster. Seven books published with some of the most reputable academic presses on a vast range of subjects - advertising and commercial culture in Nazi Germany; suicide in New Zealand; representations of the First World War in Britain, three books exploring human rights, christian identities and energy/conservation in Canada, and of course African encounters with Imperial Justice. So, we have seven more reasons to celebrate this December. We'll be toasting to a year of hard, productive and rewarding work.






A Harvest of Books

Aug 13, 2013


After 5 years in the making "Imperial Justice" is finally out with Oxford University Press (UK). This book is not simply about imperial justice and the adjudication of Empire, it is about dealing with difference. How do individuals and societies construct, maintain and negotiate difference? How do we deal with those who look, think and act different from us? My hope is that the book will find an audience beyond academic readers.

I am encouraged by the comments of one early reader:

"I am really enjoying the book. It is not only fascinating but well written!  You've done a wonderful job of organizing piles of detailed information into a coherent structure that still has all the human drama that leads the reader through. I don't often describe scholarly books as 'page turners' but this one is." - Ruth Pincoe, Editorial Consultant

http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199664849.do#.UgrjZZKshcY

Imperial Justice: Africans in Empire's Court

Jun 14, 2013

In this insightful New York Times op-ed, the historian of Africa David Anderson, reflects on the historic decision by the British government to pay compensation to Africans who suffered torture in the hands of British colonial officials in Kenya. Anderson cautions today's political leaders that with the passage of time, today's human rights violations will have to be paid for in the future.

Anderson asks: "Would the United States be so accommodating to a similar claim? In the current political climate, probably not. But times change. Fifty years from now, will Americans face claims from Guantánamo survivors? You might, and perhaps you should."

******************************************
Atoning for the Sins of Empire

By David M. Anderson 

THE British do not torture. At least, that is what we in Britain have always liked to think. But not anymore. In a historic decision last week, the British government agreed to compensate 5,228 Kenyans who were tortured and abused while detained during the Mau Mau rebellion of the 1950s. Each claimant will receive around £2,670 (about $4,000).

The money is paltry. But the principle it establishes, and the history it rewrites, are both profound. This is the first historical claim for compensation that the British government has accepted. It has never before admitted to committing torture in any part of its former empire.

In recent years there has been a clamor for official apologies. In 2010, Britain formally apologized for its army’s conduct in the infamous “Bloody Sunday” killings in Northern Ireland in 1972, and earlier this year Prime Minister David Cameron visited Amritsar, India, the site of a 1919 massacre, and expressed “regret for the loss of life.”

The Kenyan case has been in process for a decade in London’s High Court. The British fought to avoid paying reparations, so the decision to settle is a significant change of direction. The decision comes months ahead of the 50th anniversary of the British departure from Kenya — once thought of as the “white man’s country” in East Africa.

The Kenya case turned on the evidence of historians, including my own role as an expert witness. I identified a large tranche of documents that the British government smuggled out of Kenya in 1963 and brought back to London. The judge ordered the release of this long-hidden “secret” cache, some 1,500 files.

The evidence of torture revealed in these documents was devastating. In the detention camps of colonial Kenya, a tough regime of physical and mental abuse of suspects was implemented from 1957 onward, as part of a government policy to induce detainees to obey orders or to make confessions.

The documents showed that responsibility for torture went right to the top — sanctioned by Kenya’s governor, Evelyn Baring, and authorized at cabinet level in London by Alan Lennox-Boyd, then secretary of state for the colonies in Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government.

Colonial Brutality Revisited: "Atoning for the Sins of Empire"

Jun 13, 2012


There has been much furor over the controversial statements credited to Canadian journalist and bestselling author, Malcolm Gladwell that Apple’s Steve Jobs will likely be forgotten for his contributions to the technology industry while Microsoft’s Bill Gates will be remembered for his philanthropy rather than entrepreneurship.

According to Gladwell, "Gates is the most ruthless capitalist, and then he wakes up one morning and he says, 'enough.' And he steps down, he takes his money, he takes it off the table… I firmly believe that 50 years from now, [Gates] will be remembered for his charitable work, no one will even remember what Microsoft is." Gladwell was referring of course to Gates' charitable work through the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation which has given over $2.6 billion in grants to causes around the world since 1994.

Even as a historian, I am reluctant to get into the business of predicting who history will remember or forget. There are certain things we should simply just leave to posterity.

But this much I can say. If history is any guide, there may be a ring of truth to Gladwell’s statement. Having worked in many parts of the developing world as both human rights educator and researcher, I can attest to the fact that the American industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegies is much better remembered today than most of his entrepreneurial contemporaries.

Andrew Carnegie is remembered today not for his pioneering innovations in the steel industry but for his public service. Between 1883 and 1929 the Scottish-American businessman and philanthropist built 2,509 Carnegie libraries around the world. 1,689 in the United States, 660 in Britain and Ireland, 125 in Canada, and others in Australia, New Zealand, Serbia, the Caribbean, and Fiji.

The story of the benevolent American who spent his fortune promoting public education and building libraries around the world has been passed on from generation to generation. The several Carnegie foundations he established continue to do great public service – The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs  where I was formerly a Research Fellow (Full disclosure)

So, although I am not inclined to be drawn into the debates on who history will remember or forget, the lesson of Andrew Carnegie is that public service has a much longer lasting legacy.

The Great "Who will History Remember" Debate: Steve Jobs or Bill Gates? The Lesson of Andrew Carnegie

Apr 18, 2012

The editors of the Bulletin of the Canadian Historical Association invited me to do a reflection on teaching Africa in Canada. This appeared in the April 2012 edition.

***********************
“What Comes to Mind when you think about Africa?” Doing African History in the Canadian Academe

Every term, I begin teaching my undergraduate class in African History with the same question: “What images come to mind when you think about Africa?” And every year, I get pretty much the same answers: war and poverty; famines and starving children; safaris and wild animals; tribal people and exotic costumes. Sometimes, I get the odd “Nelson Mandela” or “The Lion King” (the Disney animated movie with an African theme). For the most part however, the images my students bring to class come, not from personal experiences, but straight out of the popular media.

These images sometimes prod their interest in African history. Students come to my class wanting to know more about apartheid in South Africa because they have seen the movie Invictus, or more know about the Rwandan Genocide after seeing Hotel Rwanda. But these images also pose enormous challenge for anyone teaching Africa in the Canada and many parts of the West. How do you get these students, products of the internet age and a pervasive sound bite media culture, to think about Africa beyond the ubiquitous stereotypical images and representations of the continent? It is a daunting task.

I started teaching African History over a decade ago, first in Africa and later in the United Kingdom and the United States. In these places, African history holds certain relevance. In Africa, African history is local history; in the United Kingdom it is an integral part of British imperial history; in the United States it is tied to the African-American experience. In Canada, the story is slightly different. African history does not enjoy the same interconnectedness with local history as it does in Africa, Europe or the United States. It should. One can point to several links between African and Canadian history dating back to the eighteenth century black loyalists of Nova Scotia. Still, many of my students come to my classes with very little background in African history. They may have learnt about ancient Egypt, the Pharaohs and the pyramids in High School, but chances are that they did so as part as a history of Western Civilization rather than African History.

“What Comes to Mind when you think about Africa?” Doing African History in the Canadian Academe

 
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